Thursday, September 15, 2011

axiology of value



After considering the significance of value, in the axiological sense, I have arrived at an unexpected conclusion.  For something to have value, that object must first be referenced in some conceptual framework. No object innately possesses the qualities “good” or “bad,” that object can only be good or bad for something in a correlative framework.  An example of this would be to consider a rock.  Is a rock good or bad?  Well, some rocks are good for building, but this is only because there is an established framework with certain criteria concerning what qualifies as good building material. Without specifying any intended use, or some framework with which it can be referenced, the rock is not good or bad, right or wrong, it just is.  This theory may seem inconsequential, but there are deeper and clearly significant repercussions when applied to other metaphysical subjects.  For example, if something cannot have value outside of some conceptual framework, then there is no objective or absolute moral right and wrong. For an action to be considered a morally good action, that action must be good for someone or something.